Jim Creegan and Marlyn Vogt-Downey present a dramatic narrative of some of the key events of 1917. The narrative is interspersed with readings from contemporary witnesses including John Reed, Leon Trotsy and Nikolai Sukhanov. This was a segment of the special broadcast on WBAI radio in New York celebrating the 100th Anniversary of the October Revolution.
Showing posts with label October. Show all posts
Showing posts with label October. Show all posts
October Revolution: Transcript of Interview with Alexander Rabinowitch
Note: This is the transcript of an interview conducted on Nov. 7,
2017 by Alex Steiner (A.S in the interview text) with Dr. Alexander
Rabinowitch (A.R. in text). The interview aired on WBAI radio in New Yok on
Nov 16, 2017 as part of a 2-hour special broadcast devoted to the October
Revolution.
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A link to the audio of the
entire broadcast can be found here:
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The audio of the interview segment can be found here:
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A.S.
In our next segment we go to an interview
I conducted with Dr. Alexander Rabinowitch, Professor Emeritus from Indiana
University where he taught from 1968 to 1999.
Since 2013 Dr. Rabinowitch has been affiliated research scholar with the
St. Petersburg Institute of History, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is
recognized internationally as the leading expert on the Russian revolution. His
three books on the subject, Prelude to Revolution, The Bolsheviks Come
to Power, and The Bolsheviks in Power, are
considered by many to be the definitive historical account of the Russian
Revolution as it emerged in the key city of Petrograd. Dr. Rabinowitch remains
very active, traveling to conferences all over the world and is currently working
on another book chronicling the civil war years in Petrograd.
Dr. Rabinowitch it is great to
have you with us. To start off before
getting to our main topic I would just like to ask you how you became
interested in the Russian Revolution and what motivated you to devote your
entire professional career to its study.
A.R.
Sure. My mother and father were Russian. My
mother was from Ukraine which was part of Russia when she was born. My dad was
from St. Petersburg. They both fled Russia in 1918 during the Red Terror. My
dad was then a second-year student at St. Petersburg University, second or
third year student. He was Eugene Rabinowitch, quite a famous biochemist but
also co-founding editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. He
had been on the Manhattan Project, was very disturbed by the building of the
bomb and the implications of the bomb and founded that journal which is still
going strong today. He was also a co-founder with Bertrand Russell of the
Pugwash conferences of Soviet and American scientists and scientists from other
countries also concerned with problems related to the implications of science in
the modern world and the potential of science. My dad got his PhD in Berlin and
ended up in London where I was born and we moved before the war. My dad got a
job at MIT in Boston Massachusetts and I grew up in a Russian immigrant
community surrounded by people who had fled the revolution. There people like
Alexander Kerensky who I knew, who was the Prime Minister of Russia for much of
the Provisional Government period. Vladimir Nabokov, the writer, several
leading Mensheviks etc.
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| Alexander Kerensky |
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| Boris Nicolaevsky |
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| Irakli Tsereteli |
A.S.
You knew them personally?
A.R.
Yes. I was fairly young then, but
people like Boris Nikolaevsky, who was sort of the archivist of the Social
Democrats, was a kind of grandfather to me. He lived in our barn in our summer
home in Vermont for years and wrote many of his works there. Irakli Tsereteli, the leading Georgian Menshevik,
I remember well. I interviewed Kerensky a couple of times after I got serious
about the Revolution. But anyway, I grew up hostile to everything about the
revolution. But what sort of transformed me - didn't make me a Marxist, but
changed my views on the revolution - was work with Leopold Haimson at
the University of Chicago. He was a wonderful teacher and I became seriously interested
in the Russian Revolution and as soon as I started working in the sources - and
in the newspaper - I very, very quickly changed my views. It was clear to me that
the people I had known as a kid and my parents had been forced to leave Russia -understandably,
they had been the losers in the struggle for power in 1917- but what came out
in the sources was that what had happened in 1917 in Petrograd was a
fundamental social and political revolution that fascinated me. That's how I
became interested in the subject professionally. Haimson certainly was a very
thoughtful social historian, probably on the left but not - I don't think - a Marxist.
In any case he was an inspirational teacher and with his help I became fascinated
by the subject. And then I was hooked by the material I was finding in
libraries and archives and I went to the Soviet Union in 1963-64 and spent the
year there working on the July uprising of 1917, mostly in libraries because the
archives were closed to Western scholars. More and more I got fascinated by the
subject and turned on by putting together bits and pieces and realizing that I
couldn't do a photographic picture - that any picture that I did or any
historian does is shaped by his background and his or her own views - but I
loved trying to come as close as I possibly could to what actually happened.
A.S.
Well you have pretty much devoted
your entire professional career to the study of the Russian Revolution and kind
of in a microcosm you focus on what happened in Petrograd and there basically
only for a period of about a year and a half or so from the July days which was
July 1917 on the old calendar till about November 1918 when the first
anniversary of the revolution occurred. You broke some new ground by going
through original documents to trace in detail the real dynamics of the
relationship between the Bolsheviks led by Lenin and the working class and
soldiers of Petrograd. In the course of your work you definitively debunked a
number of myths about the October Revolution and I'd like to ask you to explain
what some of those myths are and how your book debunks them. For instance, there's
the myth that the October Revolution was a coup engineered by a tiny group of
zealots unconnected to the masses and the associated myth that the masses in
turn genuinely wanted the ‘democratic liberal’ regime that was supposedly
represented by the Provisional Government. Just this weekend The
Wall Street Journal had an article with more or less this theme about
the coup of 1917 and the zealots that led it and so on. Can you explain how your books debunk that
myth and what you actually found to be the case?
A.R.
Well first of all I found that what was taking
place was from February on was a major social and political upheaval that was
very difficult to stop in midstream. I found that far from being the small band
of “conspiratorial followers by the numbers” of Lenin in seizing power, from February
on the Bolsheviks tried to develop a mass party. They grew enormously among
workers and soldiers. They made a great effort to build connections with
factory committees in factories and in trade unions getting strength and among
garrison troops. More than any other party they were concerned with building roots
among the masses and they helped shape mass views but they also were shaped by
mass views. The party and in 1917 - far from being a centralized troop movement
that - I think it's Applebaum - describes in the Wall Street Journal, they
became a mass party and a decentralized party with relatively democratic
decision-making and this was terribly important in their success. It almost was
catastrophic in July 1917 during the abortive July uprising when the left-wing of
the party tried to overthrow the Provisional Government and transfer power to
the Soviets too early. My sense was that
Lenin was opposed to that and that was part of the price of having a decentralized
party. But in the long run that internal democracy and that decentralization
was critical to the party's success. On two or three occasions in July, in
September and October, Lenin issued orders to overthrow the Provisional Government
which leaders on the spot turned down because they could see that it was very
risky and probably doomed to failure with Trotsky helping lead and Lenin giving
general directions from his hiding place in Finland they developed a strategy that
ultimately led to their coming to power, their successful seizure of power. All
the moves against the Provisional government were made in the name of ‘All power
to the Soviets’, in the name of ‘Immediate peace’ in the name of transferring power
to the Constituent Assembly. When they
came to power they got widespread support precisely because the masses were
concerned that there would be another counter revolutionary attempt. There had
been one attempt in August - the abortive Kornilov coup - they were afraid of
another and they looked at the Bolsheviks not
as ‘All power to the Bolsheviks’ - that
was never said - but ‘All power to the Soviets’, multi-party Soviets. What
enabled the Bolsheviks to take power by themselves was that the Mensheviks and
the SRS and the Menshevik Internationalists all walked out of the second
Congress of Soviets that proclaimed the new government. The Left SR’s refused
to get into the government with the Bolsheviks and so the Bolsheviks were able
to form a government of their own. More and more historians are looking at the
revolution - and I got there very early in my work - as a process starting with
the February revolution and ending with the Civil War. On the declaration of NEP
[New Economic Policy] as one process with the February revolution being a stage
of, the July uprising quite likely a stage, with the October Revolution another
stage, with the end of the Constituent Assembly another stage et cetera et
cetera. And the civil war is part of it.
Lenin’s seizure power was predicated, as
you know well Alex, on the assumption that the revolution in Russia would help
trigger worldwide socialist revolution starting in Germany. That didn't occur. One
of the things I'm finding - I haven't finished my work - you're right that I
have focused very narrowly on a couple of years in my work - but I'm finishing
up the third, really a fourth volume on Petrograd during the Civil War and the Bolshevik
survival in the Civil War. And more and
more looking at it from that perspective it looks like one major process which
takes that long to sort of complete itself. When Lenin saw that his hopes for
early socialist revolutions abroad were not happening he declared NEP, the New Economic
Policy, which was sort of a partial reversion on an economic plane to sort of
state capitalism. ‘Socialism in one country’ is not Lenin as you know Alex. That was Stalin.
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| Lenin |
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| Trotsky |
A.S.
‘Socialism in one country’ was
never dreamed of by any Marxist prior to Stalin. It was kind of this thing
where certain measures that were adopted as a result of necessity were turned
into a kind of virtue once we get to the Stalin period.
A.R.
I happen to be firmly on the side of the Bukharin
camp led by Steven Cohen, who you may know and who is a New York historian and who
is Bukharin’s biographer. He had a much less drastic, slower plan for
development which, in my view, would have avoided the great tragedy of the
Stalin era.
A.S.
Well we can certainly debate all those issues but
there's no question that external circumstances forced the Bolsheviks to adopt
measures that they originally had no intention of adopting.
A.R.
And I can personally document that for the
period October 1917 to 1921. And I do it step by step in the same way that I
tried to document what happened in 1917 and 1918. The significant difference is
that now I'm able to work in Russian archives. I work in Russian archives two months every
year. I live in St. Petersburg and work in the archives. On this next volume - maybe
the last volume, I'm not getting any younger - but I'm able to document processes
and developments at a lower level that I never could do without access to archives.
And one of the things I found is that in every archive file there is a register
of who has used those files going back to when the files were first opened,
some of them going back to the 1950s or before, and what I find is that most of
them haven't been used or a very high percentage of them haven't been looked at
and so what that leads me to believe is we have an awful, awful lot more to
learn about the Russian Revolution that we still don't know.
A.S.
Let me just get back to a couple of other myths,
for instance the myth that the Bolsheviks spoke in one voice and that basically
that was the voice of Lenin. I think your books pretty much destroyed that
conception - I mean you're not the only one who's destroyed it - but I think coming
from someone of your background with all the scholarship you have available
it's very impressive.
A.R.
Well I thank you. Actually, I came to both conclusions
initially in the 1960s when both in the West and in the Soviet Union the
Communist Party was looked at as a monolith.
A.S.
That myth is a myth that's common to both
right-wing opponents of the Russian Revolution and Stalinist apologetics for
the regime that came later in the 1930s.
A.R.
Right, and the only point I'm trying to make
is that I think I made it fairly early when those things were alive everywhere.
And then it was clear just by looking at
the April conference. The April conference, Bolshevik conference, was the first
conference after the revolution of the party and Lenin was able to participate.
It was sharply divided into a Leninist, a center group and moderate Bolsheviks,
right wing Bolsheviks - people like Kamenev and Zinoviev. They fought it out
and while Lenin sort of won the main fight regarding the direction of the revolution
and the continuation of the revolution and transfer of power to the Soviets,
the voice of the moderates was very strong and almost half of the Central
Committee were made up of moderates. And
when some people on the Left said ‘Well wait a minute we don't want all those
moderates’, Lenin said, ‘No we need them. They have ties to the masses and
Kamenev’s voice is important.’ You'll find that in the April conference protocols.
So that Lenin tolerated that lively
debate and that lively debate was essential in September when Lenin called for
the immediate seizure of power in mid-September. It was way too early - it's clear
to all historians now that would have been too early - and a majority of the
Central Committee and there was a National Conference in Petrograd at the time -
a majority of it voted to ignore Lenin's directives and that was to the good of
the party. After the Revolution Lenin more or less conceded it. And Stalin conceded that Trotsky had been the
main leader to voice the tactics that grew out of the situation on the ground.
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| Bukharin |
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| Kamenev |
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| Zinoviev |
A.S.
Why do you think that after your definitive historical
account and others this myth of the Bolshevik seizure of power by a fanatical
sect and the authoritarian nature of the Bolsheviks and their “inflexibility”, why
do these myths still persist?
A.R.
They persist for different reasons in
different places. In the West they persist partly - say in the United States - because
of hostility to Russia that’s still a product of the Cold War and it's now
complicated by these charges of Russian intervention in our electoral system
and sort of a gut anti-communism, so that several years ago I remember people
like Leo Haimson saying that this was a thing of the past, that mythology. But I always didn't feel that way and it's
come back stronger than ever as was reflected in all of the New York
Times' pieces on the revolution in their series and most recently in The Wall
Street Journal. In Russia it's
somewhat different. I've been in Moscow and Petersburg several times in the last
few months at ‘1917’ conferences, three in Moscow and two in Petersburg and it’s
quite clear that at the professional level, among professional historians,
serious work is going on and no serious historian is a prisoner of that mythology.
But the government, the Putin government, is motivated by a desire for
stability and they use nationalism and religious orthodoxy etc., traditional
Russian values, implicitly and explicitly, trying to - as we see today - ignore
the Revolution and the revolutionary date. They don't want a revolution,
understandably - they are another authoritarian regime - and they, that's not
in Putin's interest, and so they're helping - sort of encourage – new mythologies.
But I want to emphasize that I'm struck
by the way a very politicized topic for the whole hundred years since the
revolution among serious Russian historians now has become de-politicized and
seriously studied.
A.S.
I note that the Putin regime not only ignored the
anniversary of the revolution but they tried to replace it by something called ‘National
Unity Day’, which is, I believe, some invention of the Czarist regime that
celebrates some uprising against the Poles in the 17th century.
A.R.
Yes, in any case it's not the same day but
what you say is true. The Communist Party has tried to organize a few things
the last few days but it's very feeble or everything you say is true.
A.S.
To end off, could you say a few
words about why it's important for us today to remember the Russian Revolution
and are there any lessons for us today about what happened in 1917?
A.R.
Well different people a look at
the lessons of 1917 differently. To many Marxist the 1917 revolution, which was
the most important event of the 20th century, in the largest country in the
world, is an important case study for understanding revolution and making
revolution. I just came from a large conference in Brussels day before yesterday.
I was there for four days in a workers’ hall in which Lenin spoke in 1914,
which was largely populated by devoted communists. and remained communists. And
they listen to me very carefully and I know what was in their minds. You know, what can we learn that might be
helpful for me. It's very different for
me. The Russian Revolution is a terribly
important example of why it's important to solve political social and economic problem
before they reached a point where a significant percent of the population sees
revolution as the only solution to their problems. But then also, I should add, one needs to have
an accurate, sensible view of the revolution. If you look at it as a coup the
lesson is very different than if it's a major revolution. The two points of
view that I described relate to people who see it as a revolution, one side
positively the other negatively.
A.S.
Well I guess on that last question we have to
differ a bit because in my view revolutions are unavoidable. But that's a
conversation for another time.
A.R.
But let me just hasten to add that I respect
that. My job is to present the most accurate picture I can. I think I have
support on the left and in the middle precisely because I am NOT ideological
and I don't have a cause except one cause, and that's to try to come as close
as I can to delivering a sense of what happened and leave it to people like you
and friends of mine who are moderates to decide how best to confront it and
deal with it.
A.S.
I appreciate that and I respect
your views. Thank you, Dr. Rabinowitch.
October Revolution: Interview with Sharon Smith
Sharon Smith, author of Subterranean Fire, Women and Socialism, is
interviewed by Marilyn Vogt-Downey on the impact of the Russian Revolution on the American working class. This interview was part of a special broadcast on WBAI radio on the 100th anniversary of the October Revolution.
October Revolution: Interview with Alexander Rabinowitch
Dr. Alexander Rabinowitch, author of Prelude to Revolution, The Bolsheviks Come to Power and The Bolsheviks in Power, is interviewed on his work and the lasting significance of the October Revolution on the occasion of the 100th Anniversary.
Centenary of the October Revolution
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| Petrograd Soviet in session |
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| Listen to a special presentation on the 100th Anniversary of the October Revolution on WBAI radio in New York, 99.5 FM, on Thursday, Nov 16 from 4 - 6 PM. The program can also be heard on the Internet at http://wbai.org |
Note: Today we celebrate the 100th Anniversary of the October Revolution. It is an event that the Russia of Vladimir Putin has tried to eradicate, replacing the old Revolution Day holiday with a Czarist invention, "National Unity Day", marking an uprising against the Poles in 1612. But historical memory cannot be so easily destroyed. This defining moment of the 20th cetury, in which for the first time in history the working class took power and kept it for a number of years, will not go gently into the night. It will remain a source of inspiration for the millions who struggle against war, imperialism, social inequality and all forms of oppression. And there is no better work of literature on the October Revolution than that written by one of its leaders, Leon Trotsky. His Preface to the History of the Russian Revolution remains an outstanding account of the dialectic of mass consciousness as a revolutionary epoch interrupts "normal" history.
This version is reprinted from the Marxist Internet Archives.
Leon Trotsky
The History of the Russian Revolution
Preface
During the first two months of 1917 Russia was still a Romanov monarchy. Eight months later the Bolsheviks stood at the helm. They were little know to anybody when the year began, and their leaders were still under indictment for state treason when they came to power. You will not find another such sharp turn in history – especially if you remember that it involves a nation of 150 million people. It is clear that the events of 1917, whatever you think of them, deserve study.
The history of a revolution, like every other history, ought first of all to tell what happened and how. That, however, is little enough. From the very telling it ought to become clear why it happened thus and not otherwise. Events can neither be regarded as a series of adventures, nor strung on the thread of a preconceived moral. They must obey their own laws. The discovery of these laws is the author’s task.
The most indubitable feature of a revolution is the direct interference of the masses in historical events. In ordinary times the state, be it monarchical or democratic, elevates itself above the nation, and history is made by specialists in that line of business - kings, ministers, bureaucrats, parliamentarians, journalists. But at those crucial moments when the old order becomes no longer endurable to the masses, they break over the barriers excluding them from the political arena, sweep aside their traditional representatives, and create by their own interference the initial groundwork for a new régime. Whether this is good or bad we leave to the judgement of moralists. We ourselves will take the facts as they are given by the objective course of development. The history of a revolution is for us first of all a history of the forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of rulership over their own destiny.
In a society that is seized by revolution classes are in conflict. It is perfectly clear, however, that the changes introduced between the beginning and the end of a revolution in the economic bases of the society and its social substratum of classes, are not sufficient to explain the course of the revolution itself, which can overthrow in a short interval age-old institutions, create new ones, and again overthrow them. The dynamic of revolutionary events is directly determined by swift, intense and passionate changes in the psychology of classes which have already formed themselves before the revolution.
The point is that society does not change its institutions as need arises, the way a mechanic changes his instruments. On the contrary, society actually takes the institutions which hang upon it as given once for all. For decades the oppositional criticism is nothing more than a safety valve for mass dissatisfaction, a condition of the stability of the social structure. Such in principle, for example, was the significance acquired by the social-democratic criticism. Entirely exceptional conditions, independent of the will of persons and parties, are necessary in order to tear off from discontent the fetters of conservatism, and bring the masses to insurrection.
The swift changes of mass views and moods in an epoch of revolution thus derive, not from the flexibility and mobility of man’s mind, but just the opposite, from its deep conservatism. The chronic lag of ideas and relations behind new objective conditions, right up to the moment when the latter crash over people in the form of a catastrophe, is what creates in a period of revolution that leaping movement of ideas and passions which seems to the police mind a mere result of the activities of “demagogues.”
The masses go into a revolution not with a prepared plan of social reconstruction, but with a sharp feeling that they cannot endure the old régime. Only the guiding layers of a class have a political program, and even this still requires the test of events, and the approval of the masses. The fundamental political process of the revolution thus consists in the gradual comprehension by a class of the problems arising from the social crisis – the active orientation of the masses by a method of successive approximations. The different stages of a revolutionary process, certified by a change of parties in which the more extreme always supersedes the less, express the growing pressure to the left of the masses – so long as the swing of the movement does not run into objective obstacles. When it does, there begins a reaction: disappointments of the different layers of the revolutionary class, growth of indifferentism, and therewith a strengthening of the position of the counter-revolutionary forces. Such, at least, is the general outline of the old revolutions.
Only on the basis of a study of political processes in the masses themselves, can we understand the rôle of parties and leaders, whom we least of all are inclined to ignore. They constitute not an independent, but nevertheless a very important, element in the process. Without a guiding organisation, the energy of the masses would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston-box. But nevertheless what moves things is not the piston or the box, but the steam.
The difficulties which stand in the way of studying the changes of mass consciousness in a revolutionary epoch are quite obvious. The oppressed classes make history in the factories, in the barracks, in the villages, on the streets of the cities. Moreover, they are least of all accustomed to write things down. Periods of high tension in social passions leave little room for contemplation and reflection. All the muses – even the plebeian muse of journalism, in spite of her sturdy hips – have hard sledding in times of revolution. Still the historian’s situation is by no means hopeless. The records are incomplete, scattered, accidental. But in the light of the events themselves these fragments often permit a guess as to the direction and rhythm of the hidden process. For better or worse, a revolutionary party bases its tactics upon a calculation of the changes of mass consciousness. The historic course of Bolshevism demonstrates that such a calculation, at least in its rough features, can be made. If it can be made by a revolutionary leader in the whirlpool of the struggle, why not by the historian afterwards?
However, the processes taking place in the consciousness of the masses are not unrelated and independent. No matter how the idealists and the eclectics rage, consciousness is nevertheless determined by conditions. In the historic conditions which formed Russia, her economy, her classes, her State, in the action upon her of other states, we ought to be able to find the premises both of the February revolution and of the October revolution which replaced it. Since the greatest enigma is the fact that a backward country was the first to place the proletariat in power, it behoves us to seek the solution of that enigma in the peculiarities of that backward country – that is, in its differences from other countries.
The historic peculiarities of Russia and their relative weight will be characterised by us in the early chapters of this book which give a short outline of the development of Russian society and its inner forces. We venture to hope that the inevitable schematism of these chapters will not repel the reader. In the further development of the book he will meet these same forces in living action.
This work will not rely in any degree upon personal recollections. The circumstance that the author was a participant in the events does not free him from the obligation to base his exposition upon historically verified documents. The author speaks of himself, in so far as that is demanded by the course of events, in the third person. And that is not a mere literary form: the subjective tone, inevitable in autobiographies or memoirs, is not permissible in a work of history.
However, the fact that the author did participate in the struggle naturally makes easier his understanding, not only of the psychology of the forces in action, both individual and collective, but also of the inner connection of events. This advantage will give positive results only if one condition is observed: that he does not rely upon the testimony of his own memory either in trivial details or in important matters, either in questions of fact or questions of motive and mood. The author believes that in so far as in him lies he has fulfilled this condition.
There remains the question of the political position of the author, who stands as a historian upon the same viewpoint upon which he stood as a participant in the events. The reader, of course, is not obliged to share the political views of the author, which the latter on his side has no reason to conceal. But the reader does have the right to demand that a historical work should not be the defence of a political position, but an internally well-founded portrayal of the actual process of the revolution. A historical work only then completely fulfils the mission when events unfold upon its pages in their full natural necessity.
For this, is it necessary to have the so-called historian’s “impartiality”? Nobody has yet clearly explained what this impartiality consists of. The often quoted words of Clemenceau that it is necessary to take a revolution “en bloc,” as a whole – are at the best a clever evasion. How can you take as a whole a thing whose essence consists in a split? Clemenceau’s aphorism was dictated partly by shame for his too resolute ancestors, partly by embarrassment before their shades.
One of the reactionary and therefore fashionable historians in contemporary France, L. Madelin, slandering in his drawing-room fashion the great revolution – that is, the birth of his own nation – asserts that “the historian ought to stand upon the wall of a threatened city, and behold at the same time the besiegers and the besieged”: only in this way, it seems, can he achieve a “conciliatory justice.” However, the words of Madelin himself testify that if he climbs out on the wall dividing the two camps, it is only in the character of a reconnoiterer for the reaction. It is well that he is concerned only with war camps of the past: in a time of revolution standing on the wall involves great danger. Moreover, in times of alarm the priests of “conciliatory justice” are usually found sitting on the inside of four walls waiting to see which side will win.
The serious and critical reader will not want a treacherous impartiality, which offers him a cup of conciliation with a well-settled poison of reactionary hate at the bottom, but a scientific conscientiousness, which for its sympathies and antipathies – open and undisguised – seeks support in an honest study of the facts, a determination of their real connections, an exposure of the causal laws of their movement. That is the only possible historic objectivism, and moreover it is amply sufficient, for it is verified and attested not by the good intentions of the historian, for which only he himself can vouch, but the natural laws revealed by him of the historic process itself.
The sources of this book are innumerable periodical publications, newspapers and journals, memoirs, reports, and other material, partly in manuscript, but the greater part published by the Institute of the History of the Revolution in Moscow and Leningrad. We have considered its superfluous to make reference in the text to particular publications, since that would only bother the reader. Among the books which have the character of collective historical works we have particularly used the two-volume Essays on the History of the October Revolution (Moscow-Leningrad, 1927). Written by different authors, the various parts of this book are unequal in value, but they contain at any rate abundant factual material.
The dates in our book are everywhere indicated according to the old style – that is, they are 13 days behind the international and the present Soviet calendar. The author felt obliged to use the calendar which was in use at the time of the revolution. It would have been no labour of course to translate the dates into the new style. But this operation in removing one difficulty would have created others more essential. The overthrow of the monarchy has gone into history as the February revolution; according to the Western calendar, however, it occurred in March. The armed demonstration against the imperialist policy of the Provisional Government has gone into history under the name of the “April Days,” whereas according to the Western calendar it happened in May. Not to mention other intervening events and dates, we remark only that the October revolution happened according to European reckoning in November. The calendar itself, we see, is tinted by the events, and the historian cannot handle revolutionary chronology by mere arithmetic. The reader will be kind enough to remember that before overthrowing the Byzantine calendar, the revolution had to overthrow the institutions that clung to it.
