 |
| Russian President Vladimir Putin |
Recently
the question of one’s assessment of the Russian state has become a key
issue among left wing groups, particularly those claiming to be Marxist. The reason for this is all too obvious when
we consider the events of the past few years in Syria and the Ukraine. In both
situations Russia is directly involved in a political and military conflict
that places it squarely at odds against forces supported by U.S. and European
imperialism. In the case of Syria
tensions have escalated to the point where there is a real danger of a direct confrontation
between the Russian and American military. The possibility of the world’s two
largest nuclear powers engaging each other militarily brings back memories of
the Cuban Missile Crisis at the height of the Cold War.
In
such a situation the task of revolutionary socialists is to formulate and fight
for a strategy and a program that is opposed to imperialist war and defends the
interests of the international working class.
Historically, the response of revolutionary socialists to imperialist war has been the slogan “The main enemy is at home”. This means that in a conflict between two
imperialist powers, it is impermissible to support either one or the other as a
“lesser evil”. The historic
responsibility of the working class in the imperialist countries is to work for
the defeat of their “own” Imperialist power.
On the other hand, when a conflict emerges between an imperialist power
and a colonial or semi-colonial country, it is necessary to defend the struggles
of the colonial people against imperialism.
Given this historical background it becomes clear why one’s assessment
of the nature of Russia becomes a key theoretical question. Were we to consider Russia an imperialist
power then we are duty bound to oppose Russian imperialism just as strongly as
U.S. imperialism. On the other hand
were we to consider Russia a colonial or semi-colonial country oppressed by the
great imperialist powers, then we are duty bound to support Russia in its
conflict with imperialism.
Given
the centrality of the question of the nature of Russia one would think that
groups claiming adherence to Marxism and to the traditions of Bolshevism would
have done a good deal of theoretical work based on solid evidence before coming
to any conclusions about the nature of Russia.
One would think that but one would be wrong. On the contrary, with few exceptions, most of
those groups derive their assessment of the nature of Russia not from any
original research or theoretical work but strictly from their political
prejudices. And those political
prejudices are roughly divided into two camps.
On the one side there are the traditional social chauvinists who tend to
adapt to their own ruling class. Besides
moribund Social Democratic parties these groups include outfits like the ISO
who have ties to the trade union bureaucracy.
In the other camp are what some have called “inverted social
chauvinists”. These are groups who
oppose their own bourgeoisie but do so by supporting whoever is in conflict
with them. The policy followed by the
inverted social chauvinists is sometimes mislabeled as “anti-imperialism”. In the U.S. the paradigm of inverted social
chauvinism is the neo-Stalinist Workers World Party which lets no opportunity
pass by for supporting whatever imperialist power or dictatorship is in conflict
with U.S. imperialism. They are guided
by the rule, “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
Why
is such a strategy problematic? It’s
true that there are times when it is necessary to form temporary alliances with
various forces that are in conflict with one’s main enemy. This may be particularly the case in a
military conflict where the lines of battle are constantly shifting. But Marxists don’t make decisions purely
on the basis of utilitarian calculations. We do not simply apply a cost-benefit type of
analysis in deciding on our actions. That is a way of proceeding inherited from
bourgeois philosophy, one that presumes you can make a quantitative measure of
an evaluation. When considering how to
achieve an end, Marxists recognize the dialectical relationship between means
and ends. [1]
For a Marxist some means are simply not an option. In fact sometimes it is better to lose a
battle honorably and leave a legacy that can inspire future generations, than
to achieve a “victory” at the cost of surrendering your principles. And it is not possible to “measure” the value
of this type of choice.
A perfect example of how Marxists conduct
themselves in political / military conflicts was provided by Trotsky when he
explained why he did not use his position as head of the Red Army to stage a
coup in order to remove the Stalinist bureaucracy. Trotsky said that were he to undertake such
an action and even if it was successful, it would have hopelessly corrupted the
political environment of Bolshevism and would set into motion forces that were
anathema to its principles, forces just as rotten as Stalinism. Trotsky’s
refusal to use a corrupt “means” to bring about a desired “end” is the one
point on which practically all commentators take strong exception. Because they cannot fathom that Marxist
strategy cannot be reduced to a cold calculation of means and ends they
invariably accuse Trotsky of being “impractical” or of harboring a secret death
wish.
A
more muted version of the politics of inverted social chauvinism can be seen in
the various twists and turns of the World Socialist Web Site (WSWS) providing
backhanded support for the Putin regime.[2] But for a good parody of Marxism and a lesson
in the absurdities one gets into when one forgets the difference between
Marxism and pragmatic utilitarian calculation nothing can top the Spartacist League’s support for the ultra-reactionary Islamic State. A recent
Spartacist resolution states,
“We
have a military side with the reactionary ISIL when it engages in military
conflict with the imperialists and their local forces on the ground, including
the Iraqi Kurdish pesh merga, the Baghdad government, Shi’ite militias and
the Syrian Kurds. We give no political support to any of these retrograde
forces.”...) [3]
While
expressing themselves somewhat opaquely, the meaning of the phrase “We have a
military side with the reactionary ISIL” is that the Spartacist group thinks it
is legitimate to form a military bloc with ISIL and they think that this is
somehow completely divorced from any political implication. But in reality it
is not possible to completely separate military and political collaboration.
In
this case it is not even good utilitarian calculation. Just
think about the implications of their “military side with ISIL”. How would this be carried out in
practice? Would a Spartacist delegation
make its way to Syria, find its way to a territory controlled by ISIL and
proclaim, “We are communists and atheists and think your politics is
reactionary, but we are willing to form a temporary military alliance with you
as long as you respect our independence.” Let us be generous and suppose that the
Spartacist position is not meant as a realistic practical policy but an
educational example for the working class.
But then what kind of lesson does this offer the international working
class? That a group claiming to be Marxist and Trotskyist is willing to work
with a genocidal outfit like ISIL, despite the fact that ISIL militants would
undoubtedly execute every Spartacist on the spot if they had the chance. The reaction of most workers would
undoubtedly be that these people are insane, and they would not be far off.
With
few exceptions none of the champions of the thesis that Russia is an
imperialist power or the opposite thesis that it is an oppressed colonial
country (or in some cases still a workers state of some sort) have provided any
significant analysis to justify their claims. Given this context of the dearth
of Marxist theory on the seminal question of the nature of Russia it is most
refreshing to have come across the analysis of Michael Pröbsting.
Pröbsting’s
essay, ‘Russia as a Great Imperialist Power The formation of Russian
Monopoly Capital and its Empire: A Reply to our Critics’,[4]
is a serious analysis of the nature of Russia. Whatever one thinks of
its conclusions it is in stark contrast to the vapid pronouncements of various
left groups who proclaim that Russia is - or is not - an imperialist nation
based on one or two isolated observations.
[5] We
wish to focus attention on Pröbsting’s essay as an example of the kind of
theoretical work that Marxists, who take questions of imperialism, war and
peace seriously, should be engaged in.
This does not imply that we are in political agreement with Pröbsting or
the group he represents, the "Revolutionary Communist International
Tendency". Indeed we strongly
oppose the position of this group on the conflict in Syria. They have proclaimed their support for some
of the Islamist groups fighting the Assad regime. The Islamist opponents of Assad are
thoroughly reactionary and should be opposed with at least as much fervor as
the Assad regime.
But it would be a mistake to dismiss Pröbsting's
analysis of Russia on the basis of the political positions he supports. Rather Pröbsting's analysis of Russia
warrants a critique on the level in which it was written. To our knowledge the most extensive response
to Pröbsting is the one written by Jan Norden from the “League for the Fourth
International”. [6] We will have more to say about Norden's piece
presently.
Pröbsting’s thesis is that Russia today is indeed a
great imperialist power. His analysis
first tries to categorize Russia within the context of the Marxist
understanding of imperialism going back to Lenin's classic works, Imperialism
and the Split in Socialism and Imperialism the Highest Stage of
Capitalism. He provides the
following quote from Lenin laying out the fundamental criteria for an
imperialist state:
“We have to begin with as precise and full a
definition of imperialism as possible. Imperialism is a specific historical
stage of capitalism. Its specific character is threefold: imperialism is
monopoly capitalism; parasitic, or decaying capitalism; moribund capitalism.
The supplanting of free competition by monopoly is the fundamental economic
feature, the quintessence of imperialism. Monopoly manifests itself in five
principal forms: (1) cartels, syndicates and trusts—the concentration of
production has reached a degree which gives rise to these monopolistic
associations of capitalists; (2) the monopolistic position of the big
banks—three, four or five giant banks manipulate the whole economic life of
America, France, Germany; (3) seizure of the sources of raw material by the
trusts and the financial oligarchy (finance capital is monopoly industrial
capital merged with bank capital); (4) the (economic) partition of the world by
the international cartels has begun. There are already over one hundred such
international cartels, which command the entire world market and divide it
“amicably” among themselves—until war redivides it. The export of capital, as
distinct from the export of commodities under non-monopoly capitalism, is a
highly characteristic phenomenon and is closely linked with the economic and
territorial-political partition of the world; (5) the territorial partition of
the world (colonies) is completed.” [7]
Before proceeding to examine how Russia fits into
these criteria Pröbsting provides the following caveat,
“…we are fully aware that such definitions are not
abstract dogmas but have to be understood as elastic categories. Lenin put such
a dialectical approach once wisely: '…without forgetting the conditional and
relative value of all definitions in general, which can never embrace all the
concatenations of a phenomenon in its full development…' [8]
Following his introduction of Lenin's criteria Pröbsting
makes a methodological point which we think is absolutely correct,
“The characteristic of an imperialist power has to
be seen in the totality of its economic, political, and military position in
the global hierarchy of states. Thus, a given state must – following Lenin’s
dialectical advice about examining 'the entire totality of the manifold
relations of this thing to others’ –
be viewed not only as a separate unit but first and foremost in its relation to
other states and nations. An imperialist state usually enters a relationship
with other states and nations whom it oppresses in one way or another and
super-exploits – i.e., appropriates a share of its produced capitalist value.
Again this has to be viewed in its totality, i.e., if a state gains certain
profits from foreign investment but has to pay much more (debt service, profit
repatriation, etc.) to other countries’ foreign investment, this state can
usually not being considered as imperialist. Finally we want to stress the
necessity of considering the totality of a state’s economic, political, and
military position in the global hierarchy of states. Thus we can consider a
given state as imperialist even it is economically weaker but possesses a
relatively strong political and military position (like Russia before 1917 and,
again, in the early 2000s). Such a strong political and military position can
be used to oppress other countries and nations and to appropriate capitalist
value from them.” [9]
Pröbsting's point is that there is a
wide range of factors to consider in determining whether Russia is or is not an
imperialist nation. And Russia’s status must be evaluated in the context of its
relationship to the world economy and other nations. Furthermore, we
should not expect all imperialist nations to satisfy the criteria laid out by
Lenin in the same way. Some will be stronger than others. Some will be more
advanced in one area than others. And particularly in the 21st century, much
more so than 100 years ago when Lenin was writing, we can expect some genuine
surprises through the work of the law of uneven and combined development. It
turns out that many of those countries formerly dismissed as backwards and
lacking the technological and economic infrastructure that took centuries to
develop in Europe have a distinct advantage when it comes to harnessing
the power of modern technology and communications. It is much easier to build
the infrastructure for digital communications from scratch than to convert
older technology to the newer ones. It is also much easier and more
efficient from a capitalist point of view to build new manufacturing facilities
than to tear down or convert old ones. Thus
we have the paradoxical situation where "backward" countries that
never developed a 20th century infrastructure have practically overnight
developed a 21st century infrastructure that is more advanced than
those found in many European countries. [10]
This working of the law of combined and uneven
development has enormous implications when assessing the status of
nations. It means that you cannot take
one feature of what has traditionally been described as defining the nature of
an imperialist nation and use that as a decisive determinant. This point is
worth bearing in mind when the argument is presented that Russia is not an
imperialist nation because, for instance, the financial sector of its economy
is not the dominant one. It is true that
Russia's financial sector lags behind but by that criteria you can say the same
thing about Germany, a country which few would dispute qualifies as an
imperialist nation. [11]
Pröbsting proceeds in his essay to examine a great
deal of statistics about the Russian economy and its military standing in
comparison with other countries. One of
the key indices for whether a country’s economy
is dominated by other nations – and thus stands in relation to them as
an exploited country -is the comparison of what is called outward facing FDI
(Foreign Direct investments) to inward facing FDI. It has been argued by some
that Russia's inward facing FDI (ie. Investments in Russia from other
countries) is larger than its outward facing FDI and this proves that Russia is
an oppressed semi-colonial country. Pröbsting
disputes this, writing,
“…in recent years, Russia has even invested more
abroad than was invested in her by foreign countries. While Russia received US$
43.3 billion in inward FDI in 2010 and US$ 52.9 billion in 2011, Russian
corporations invested outside the country US$ 52.5 billion in 2010 and US$ 67.3
billion in 2011.29."
Much of the argument hangs on the interpretation of
statistics. Norden, in his critique of Pröbsting,
writes,
“In addition, while in imperialist countries
foreign investment outside the country (44% of GDP in “developed economies”)
almost always exceeds foreign investment inside the country (33% of GDP), in
Russia outward foreign direct investment (21% of GDP) is less than inward FDI
(26%), though the gap is not nearly as great as with the larger semi-colonial
countries where capital inflows can be double or triple the outflows.”
The reason for the discrepancy between Norden's
figures and those of Pröbsting is not
clear as both are citing the same source for their figures, namely, UNCTAD:
World Investment Report. Pröbsting's cites the 2012 report and Norden the 2013
report. Regardless, it seems completely
artificial to base one's judgment on the nature of Russia on a few percentage
points one way or the other of its outward FDI as compared to its inward FDI.
Norden also makes a point, one acknowledged by Pröbsting,
that figures for outward FDI and inward FDI for Russia are particularly
difficult to take at face value because the practice of “round tripping” is
prevalent among Russian capitalists. What this refers to is the use Russian
investors make of foreign tax
shelters like Cyprus to launder their money.
On paper parking your investment in a bank in Cyprus appears as an outward
facing FDI. In reality that same investment is later returned to Russia,
perhaps through the agency of a separate corporation, and can be considered an
inward facing FDI. Norden points to
this phenomenon as artificially inflating the figures for Russian outward FDI.
He writes,
“Moreover,
a large part of the capital outflows from Russia are hardly foreign investment
at all, but hiding funds in offshore tax havens.”
Why
this fact gives weight to the thesis that Russia is dominated by foreign
capital is however hard to fathom. While
it is true that the practice of “round tripping” artificially inflates figures
for outward facing FDI, it also artificially inflates figures for inward facing
FDI when those “investments” from Cyprus are repatriated. In the end it should
be more or less a wash in terms of the percentage of outward to inward facing FDI.
Basing
his work on an impressive amount of carefully annotated historical and
statistical research Pröbsting provides a credible theory of the rise of Russia
as an imperialist power. He shows how after the restoration of capitalism in
Russia in the early 1990’s the Russian economy essentially collapsed and Russia
was at that point in real danger of falling into the status of a semi-colonial
country wholly dependent on U.S. and European imperialism. But with the advent of Putin a Bonapartist
regime emerged which was strong enough to galvanize the Russian bourgeoisie and
climb out of the abyss of the early days of capitalist restoration. He writes,
“To
fully implement capitalism as a political and economic project the Putin regime
had to and has to create a strong bonapartist state, a “patriotic”, i.e. Great
Russian chauvinist ideology (for both the second Chechnya war was very
important), a strengthening of the repression apparatus, a subordination of
individual Oligarchs (in the political sphere) and the regional governors,
removing the huge wage and payment arrears, the improvement of conditions for
capitalist production (starting from tax reform to Land and Labour code reform)
and the initiation of a huge investment offensive in the infrastructure.”
Pröbsting
notes that with the structural changes brought about by the Bonapartist Putin
regime, Russia emerged from the chaos of the 1990s as an imperialist state,
much as it was during the Czarist period of the 19th and early 20th centuries. He
writes,
Furthermore,
like the Russia of the Czarist period, Russian imperialism is much weaker than
its imperialist rivals in North America and Europe. It is also a regional power
rather than a global one. To be sure Russian capitalism cannot escape the
crisis wracking the world capitalist system and there are many obstacles to
Russia becoming anything more than a regional power in Central Asia and Eastern
Europe with some influence in the Middle East as witnessed by its military
intervention in the civil war in Syria.
On
this last point Norden differs with Pröbsting.
Norden considers Russia to be a “transitional” state, perhaps on the
road to imperialism but not there yet. He
discounts Pröbsting’s thesis that Russia is exploiting some of its neighbors in
Central Asia and the Ukraine. He claims
that Pröbsting’s figures are bogus and the actual figures do not show any
significant economic domination by Russia of its neighbors.
Whether
Norden’s criticism of Pröbsting’s analysis of the data is correct or not I do
not find his distinction between a “transitional capitalism” and a weak and
regional imperialist power convincing. There is little doubt that Russia today plays
a role similar to the Russia of the Czarist Empire as a regional power that
dominates its neighbors. In addition few
would argue that it maintains a full- fledged colonial occupation in Chechnya. It is also true that Russia is playing a
largely defensive role vis a vis the aggressive moves of U.S. and European imperialism in the Ukraine,
the Baltics and its Western borders in general. But that fact does not make
Russia a “semi-colonial” country as some have claimed. [12]
In addition, Russia does have a
significant presence in world finance, though its influence is dwarfed by that
of the U.S. and the U.K. not to mention China! Furthermore we may ask if Russia
is a transitional regime, what is it transitioning into and how long can one
expect that transition to work itself out?
It
is noteworthy that Pröbsting’s analysis includes a very fair discussion of the
response of some of his critics. This is very unusual for contemporary Marxist
polemics. More typical is the polemic
that presents straw-men type arguments against a political opponent and
outright misrepresents what they say.
But I have to commend Pröbsting for presenting lengthy quotes unaltered,
from his polemical opponents so that readers
can judge for themselves what they are saying. One can only welcome this exhibit of honest debate. Let us hope this becomes the norm rather than
the exception.
Pröbsting’s
piece is of course not beyond criticism and one of the reasons we are focusing
on it is to encourage a healthy discussion on the enormously important question
of the nature of Russia today.
To
read Pröbsting’s analysis in its entirety, go here ==>>
To
read Norden’s critique of Pröbsting in its entirety, go here ==>>
Alex Steiner, Nov 7, 2015
[1]
Trotsky argued this point in an exchange with the American philosopher John
Dewey, Their Morals and Ours,
[2] We
have commented on this previously in the essay,
The SEP on the nature of Russia
and China,
http://forum.permanent-revolution.org/2014/10/the-sep-on-nature-of-russia-and-china.html
and in our polemic.
Crackpot
Philosophy and double think, http://forum.permanent-revolution.org/2015/09/crackpot-philosophy-and-doublespeak.html
[4] A
PDF of Pröbsting’s analysis can be downloaded at the following site: http://www.thecommunists.net/theory/imperialist-russia/
[5]
For instance, take this statement from an article on the World Socialist Web
Site,
‘In contrast to the United States, Russia is
not an imperialist country. It functions chiefly as a supplier of energy to the
world market and as a sales market for global concerns. The total value of all
Russian shares was put at $531 billion in November, above all due to western
sanctions. This is less than one US company alone, Apple, with a share value of
$620 billion.’
Yet another author on the World Socialist Web Site
provides a bit of unintended irony when,
while lashing out against a rival group, writes,
‘For the ISO, the definition of Russia as an
imperialist power emerges not on the basis of a serious examination of the
country’s historical evolution or the nature of the society that emerged out of
the dissolution of the USSR. Rather, it is a terminological expedient that
allows it to support US-led military operations against Russia. Thus, in the
supposedly inter-imperialist conflict between the Washington and Moscow, the
ISO comes down decisively in favor of the former.’
Searching through the archives of the WSWS it is not
possible to locate anything remotely resembling “a serious examination of the country’s
historical evolution or the nature of the society that emerged out of the
dissolution of the USSR.”
[6]
The critique of Pröbsting appears in an unsigned essay in the online journal, The Internationalist.
[7] Imperialism and the Split in Socialism,
V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Volume 23, pp. 105-106 (Emphasis in the original).
[8] The quote from Lenin is from Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,
Collected Works, Volume 22, page 226. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch07.htm
[9]
The quote from Lenin is from his Philosophical Notebooks, Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of
Logic (1914); in: Collected Works Vol. 38, pp. 220-222. It is taken from
the section "Summary of
Dialectics" at the end of his notes on Hegel's Science of Logic. https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/summary.htm
[10]
One interesting statistic is that as of 2013 the percentage of the population
using the Internet in Italy was only 58.46%, placing it behind such countries
as Egypt. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_Internet_users The working of the law of uneven and
combined development is even more dramatically seen when comparing the
statistics of the usage of cell phones as percentage of the population. In this
area Zimbabwe is just a bit behind France and ahead of Japan. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_mobile_phones_in_use
This relatively cheap technology has provided
readily available mass communications to parts of the world that never had it
previously.
[11]
Germany’s economy is driven by exports of manufactured goods, not by finance.
Its financial sector is relatively small compared to its industrial
sector. Probsting marshals some
statistics to demonstrate that the Russian economy in this sense is not that
different from Germany. Russia’s capitalization as a percentage of its GDP was 68.7
in the period from 2005-20010. This was
higher than Germany’s percentage of 45.7 for the same period according to the
data published by the World Bank and cited by Pröbsting. See Pröbsting, page26,
table 20.
[12] We have written elsewhere on our analysis of
the civil war in the Ukraine, most recently in the polemic, Crackpot Philosophy and double speak, http://forum.permanent-revolution.org/2015/09/crackpot-philosophy-and-doublespeak.html
